Tulsa Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 4

1975

Consumerism Takes It on the Chin: Warranty Disclaimers in
Oklahoma
Charles W. Pauly

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles W. Pauly, Consumerism Takes It on the Chin: Warranty Disclaimers in Oklahoma, 10 Tulsa L. J.
675 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss4/12

This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.
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CONSUMERISM TAKES IT ON THE CHIN:
WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS IN OKLAHOMA
Charles W. Pauly

In a day and age of expanding consumer protection many courts
are extending and enlarging the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code to reflect this trend. Courts in recent years have directed much
attention to consumerism in the area of warranties of goods and disclaimers of such warranties.' Following the strict provisions of the
Code with equally strict interpretations, most courts have been very reluctant to grant merchants much latitude in the means by which they
make warranty disclaimers. 2 Recently the Oklahoma Supreme Court
opposed this trend in Smith v. Sharpensteen.3
Sharpensteen involved an action for damages for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The suit arose out
of a lease-purchase agreement covering a diesel powered truck tractor.
The lease-purchase agreement contained a clause attempting to disclaim the seller's liability for any breach of implied warranty. By the
findings of the court, the disclaimer provision was not necessarily con1. Roto-Lith Ltd., v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962); Osborne
v. Genevie, 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262
So. 2d 452 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc.,
68 Il1. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1965); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau
Cooperative Ass'n, -Ind. App. -, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972); Hunt v. Perkins Mach.
Co., 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking
Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (1970); Minikes v. Admiral Corp., 48 Misc.
2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1966); see also, Lauer, Sales WarrantiesUnder the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. REv. 259 (1965); Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under
the Uniform Comercial Code, 47 MARQ. L. Rv. 127, 142 (1963); 22 DEPAuL L. REv.
794 (1973); 40 MIss. L.J 310 (1969).
2. Mathews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973); DeLamar Motor
Co. v. White, 460 S.W.2d 802 (Ark. 1970); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transp.
Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. Rec. 1969); Salov
v. Don Allen Chevrolet Co., 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 180 (1971); S.F.C. Acceptance Corp.
v. Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225 (1966); Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d
380 (1971); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346
(1971).
3. 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974).
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spicuous within the meaning of that term in section 1-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code. However, the buyer testified that he was required to read the entire contract, and that he read and understood the
warranty disclaimer paragraph. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that despite the fact that the disclaimer did not satisfy the disclaimer
provisions of Code section 2-316(2), since it was not conspicuous, this
section was rendered inapplicable due to the actual knowledge of the
purchaser in regard to the existence and meaning of the disclaimer.
The court also held that in the absence of misunderstanding by the
buyer, or sharp business practices by the seller, the disclaimer satisfied
section 2-316(3), which negates any necessity of compliance with subsection (2) when "in common understanding" the disclaimer language
"calls the buyer's attention" to the exclusion of warranties.5
Sections 2-316(2) and 2-316(3)(a) set out very rigid and objective standards for warranty disclaimers:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be a writing and conspicuous [emphasis added]. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all
implied warranties are excluded by expresssions
like "as is", "with all faults" or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty.
While the Code specifically states that subsection (2) is subject to subsection (3), many courts have held that, to be effective, even under
subsection (3), a warranty disclaimer must also meet the requirements
of subsection (2) in that it must be conspicuous.0 This is an obvious
4. 521 P.2d at 396; section 1-201(10) of the Uniform Commercial Code defines
"conspicuous" in this manner:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. . . . Language in the
body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or
color.
5. 521 P.2d at 395, 396.
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expansion of the express provisions of the Code.

Although Okla-

homa's decision is in keeping with this trend of reworking the express

provisions of the Code, it does so to reach a conclusion opposed to the
result of other cases. Rather than expanding upon the consumer protections of the Code, the decision restricts these protections.

In Sharpensteen the Oklahoma court held that where a buyer read
and understood a warranty disclaimer, it was effective against him de-

spite the fact that the disclaimer did not comply with section 2-316(2).
The court held that the buyer's subjective awareness and understanding
of the disclaimer were sufficient to render the disclaimer effective

against a claim of breach of implied warranty of fitness.
In finding for the seller the court gave alternative reasons for its
holding. First, the court held that the awareness of the buyer was suf-

ficient to render the conspicuousness requirement inoperative. Second, the court held that subsection (3) of section 2-316 was satisfied;

therefore, since subsection (2) is subject to subsection (3), the disclaimer need not comply with the requirements of subsection (2). If
this second basis had been the only grounds for the decision, the judg-

ment of the court would be much more defensible. It is within the
court's discretion to determine, as a matter of law, that a warranty dis7
claimer satisfied subsection (3).
However, the Oklahoma court did
not restrict its decision to this rationale; on the contrary, it even limited

this much of the holding by stating: "If there were any claim or evidence of misunderstanding by plaintiff or sharp business practices by
defendants a contrary conclusion might be required . . . ,,s It seems

obvious that either a disclaimer satisfies section 2-316(3) or it doesn't.
6. Osborne v. Genevie, 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Gindy Mfg. Corp.
v. Cardinale Truoking Corp., 111 NJ. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (1970); see also, 1
W.D. HAWKLAND; A TRANSAcrIONAL GunDE To THE UNFORm COMMERCIL CODE 77
(1964) wherein the author states:
While the subsection [2-316(3)(a)] does not explicitly so provide, it would
seem that these phrases and expressions would have to be stated conspicuously
to become effective disclaimers. Such a requirement is consistent with the general rule that the disclaimer must "call" the risk to "the buyer's attention" and
"make.. .plain [to him] that there is no implied warranty."
Donovan, Recent Developments in Products Liability Litigation in New England: The
Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 ME.L. REv. 181 at 213 (1967).
7. Geo. C. Christopher & Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185,
523 P.2d 709 (1974); Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228
(1967); Tennessee Carolina Transp. Inc. v. Strick Corp., 16 N.C. App. 498, 192 S.E.2d
702 (1972); Adams Van Service, Inc., v. Int'l Harvester Corp., 14 UCC REP. SERv. 1142
(Pa. C.P. 1973); see also, Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n,
-Ind. App. -, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972).
8. 521 P.2d at 396.
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The Code makes no exceptions to the section dependent on judicial
determinations of sharp or unfair business practices (absent cases involving fraud, etc.). 9 The court's first basis for its decision-the
buyer's subjective awareness-seems inferior to the decision which was
reached by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals:
At the trial the plaintiff in this case admitted that he had read
and knew of the above provisions before signing. However,
this is not enough by itself to dispense with the Code requirement that the language of disclaimer or modification of a warranty be conspicuous. . . . [K]nowledge in fact of a disclaimer provision does not ipso facto make it conspicuous under the. . . Code section. We conclude that the trial court
properly refused to direct a verdict for defendants because
the disclaimer provisions in the agreement were ineffective.
They were not conspicuous but in the same kind and size of
print 1as
all the other provisions in the body of this agree0
ment.
Such interpretation seems far superior to that of the supreme court; if
the ultimate objective of the UCC is to promote national uniformity
and consistency throughout commercial transactions, then courts should
stick to such an objective, at least in the absence of compelling policy
considerations.
While in the present case there may have been no serious inequities done to the plaintiff by the cour't holding, it is the potential longrange effects of the decision which make it a questionable opinion.
The decision has taken the detached objectivity created by the UCC
and placed it into a realm of subjective awareness. Taking the logical
extensions of this decision, a seller of goods may well argue that all
implied, warranties were disclaimed and that, while the contract may
not reflect this, the buyer was put on notice and subjectively was aware
of the lack of warranties. Dealing with this specific question Professors
White and Summers say:
Does it matter whether a disclaimer was printed conspicuously if the seller actually points it out to the buyer? Comment 1 to 2-316 indicates that the purpose of the conspicuousness requirement is to "protect the buyer from surprise" and
"unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimers." This
purpose should be accomplished when the buyer becomes
aware in fact of the seller's disclaimer. On the other hand,
9.

UNIFOR.M COMMERCIAL CODE §

1-103.

10. Smith v. Sharpensteen, 44 OKLA. BAR ASS'N J. 3568, 3570 (Okla. Ct. App.
1973).
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section 1-201(10) says, "A term or clause is conspicuous when
so written ... ." This situation is analogous to . . . [the
situation] where the buyer claims the disclaimer was not
actually pointed out to him. Both of these arguments would
reward the convincing liar who claims that the buyer wasor was not-made aware of the disclaimer. We think the
draftsmen intended a rigid adherence to the conspicuousness
requirement in order to avoid arguments concerning what
parties said about warranties at the time of sale. 1
Under the Oklahoma decision, no longer must a seller look to, nor may
a buyer depend upon, the statutory requirements of the Code provisions, but rather each may be bound by a court's interpretation of subjective awareness or lack of same in the buyer.
If subjective awareness is to be controlling, will a buyer be allowed
to allege a lack of such awareness even in cases where the disclaimer
satisfies the statutory requirements? Why should a seller be allowed
to circumvent the requirements of the Code and yet a buyer not be
entitled to a similar right? While it is at least arguable that subjective
awareness is desirable in this area that is not the entire issue. 2 The
intent, purpose, and desired result of the enactment of this section of
the Code was to bring uniformity and consistency to the entire area of
warranty disclaimers. If such a purpose and goal is to be changed, it
is within the power and discretion of the legislatures and should not
be undertaken by the courts.
However Oklahoma does not stand alone in its interpretation.
North Carolina has also accepted the concept of subjective awareness,
at least in dicta. In Tennessee CarolinaTransp., Inc. v. Strick Corp.,'
the court stated that the purpose of the requirement of conspicuousness
"despite its unqualified language" is to protect the buyer from unexpected language. Elaborating upon this point the court reasoned:
[C]ertainly actual awareness of the disclaimer is another circumstance which protects the buyer from the surprise of unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer ...
[P]ossibly the disclaimer should be enforced despite its inconspicuousness since the purpose of the conspicuous requirement has been satisfied.'"
11. J. WH=rE, R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 361 (1972).
12. Such subjectivity might also benefit buyers because they have been held to warranty disclaimers even without notice of same in some states. See, Koellmer v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 8 UCC REP. SERv. 668 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1970); Childers & Venters, Inc.
v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Architectural Aluminum Corp. v.
Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
13. 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973).
14. Id. at 718.
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However the court concluded that it was unnecessary for it to decide
whether the conspicuousness requirement had been satisfied by such
other circumstances since the disclaimer was found only in the security
agreement and not in the contract of sale and would still not have been
effective. 15
Some courts have specifically rejected the argument adopted by
the North Carolina and Oklahoma courts. The Florida Supreme Court
in Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp.' held that the fact that a pur-

chaser of an automobile had read the retail installment contract, including the disclaimer clause, did not render effective the disclaimer which
did not comply with the statute requiring a disclaimer to be conspicuous.1 7 Following the same line of reasoning, the Washington Court of
Appeals in Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n' 8 held that "[k~now-

ledge of a disclaimer is not sufficient to give effect to that disclaimer
so as to defeat an action for breach of warranty." 19
CONCLUSION
While courts have held that purchasers need not have actual knowledge of a disclaimer of warranties in order to make it effective, so long
as the disclaimer is in writing and conspicuous, 20 Oklahoma seems to
be the first state to hold that if a purchaser does have actual knowledge
of a disclaimer then it need not be conspicuous. Such a decision may
be questioned on the grounds that it goes against the express provisions
of the UCC. However an even more serious objection is that the Oklahoma courts may accept the decision as good precedent and begin to
apply the Code based upon subjective determinations rather than the
objectivity which the Code drafters attempted to provide. Following
the precedent in this case would lead the Oklahoma courts into a further restricting and limiting of the areas of consumer protection.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 719.
262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 455.
6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346 (1971).
Id. at 1350.
See cases cited in note 10 supra.
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